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Abstract: In his treatise Contra Nestorianos Leontius of Jerusalem refers to the 
human soul as “divine inbreathing”, which he understands as a consubstantial 
emanation from God. This paper argues that Leontius was confronted with the 
Nestorian claim that a composition between an uncreated and a created entity is 
impossible and that he refuted this claim by arguing that the soul is divine and that 
the composition of a human soul with a human body is therefore a strict parallel for 
the incarnation. One of Leontius’ starting points was the traditional view that 
Adam’s soul was endowed with the Holy Spirit and not merely with a derivative 
grace. This model had the advantage that it located “God” in the human being but 
the disadvantage that this presence remained extrinsic to the human compound. To 
make it function as a precedent for the Incarnation Leontius substituted the Son for 
the Spirit and reduced the human nature to the body thereby indicating that the soul 
must be equated with the divine Son. In order to distinguish the case of Christ from 
that of Adam and other human beings he employed the Biblical motif of the 
“pledge”, which was traditionally used to contrast the partial spiritual endowment 
of the believers in this world with their complete spiritual endowment in the world 
to come but which he now applied to Adam and Christ. This permitted him to 
claim that in Adam the Son was only partially present while in Christ he was 
present completely. Thus he conceptualised the Incarnation not as the composition 
of the divine Word with a human nature consisting of body and soul but as a 
composition of the divine Word as soul and a human body. Consequently the 
divine component of traditional Christology could no longer be given a satisfactory 
role in the salvation of humankind. One reason for this shift, it is argued in this 
paper, was a too great dependence on the conceptual framework of his Nestorian 
opponent whose focus had been on the endowment of the human being Jesus with 
the Holy Spirit, who thus assumed a crucial role in the incarnation. Leontius 
accepted this framework as well as the Nestorian custom to see the difference 
between the Spirit in Jesus and the Spirit in other human beings in quantitative 
terms, and merely modified it by identifying the Holy Spirit with the Son on the 
one hand and with the soul on the other. However, it is suggested in this paper, 
Leontius may have believed in the divinity and timelessness of the soul 
independently of his Nestorian opponent. His interpretation of Philippians 2:6-7 
suggests that he was a latter-day Origenist who could express his ideas more freely 
than his forebears because the political circumstances of the early seventh century 
made enforcement of orthodoxy impossible in the Eastern provinces. 
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The Chalcedonian theologian Leontius of Jerusalem is today best known for his 
contributions in the field of Christology, and Christological issues are indeed the 
raison d’être of his surviving works: the two treatises that bear his name defend 
the Creed of Chalcedon and Constantinople II against Nestorian and Monophysite 
attacks.1 Thus it is not surprising that modern scholars have focused on Leontius’ 
definitions of the concepts “nature”, “hypostasis” and “composition” and attempted 
to establish whether these definitions help to clarify the doctrine formulated at the 
two councils.2 However, exclusive focus on such a narrow range of topics runs the 
danger of obscuring the richness of Leontius’ theological speculation. Close reading 
of Contra Nestorianos, the longest of his extant treatises, reveals that his search for 
effective arguments leads him to other aspects of the Christian belief system and 
that his views on such aspects are highly original and often irreconcilable with the 
Patristic consensus that had been established in the fourth and fifth centuries. 
 In a recent article I have argued that Leontius used the Christological model that 
he had developed as a blueprint for a radical reorganisation of the Trinity, with the 
result that the Trinity is no longer regarded as a timeless framework within which 
the event of the incarnation takes place, but is rather seen as the result of a previous 
act of divine self-constitution.3 In this article I shift the focus to Leontius’ anthropo-
logy, which plays an important role in his attempts to prove that the incarnation 
must be conceived of as a composition of the divine nature and the human nature 
in the hypostasis of the divine Word and to rebut the claims of his Nestorian ad-
versary that such an understanding of the incarnation was neither necessary nor 
indeed possible. 
 Leontius repeatedly points out that the human being is also a composite made up 
of two elements, body and soul, which are substantially different from each other. 
Such use of the so-called anthropological paradigm had a long and distinguished 
history.4 However, it was not without problems since it glossed over the fact that 
in the case of Christ an uncreated and a created entity enter into a composition 
whereas in the case of the human being both components are created. If Leontius 
had merely followed established tradition we would need to conclude that his 
arguments fail to address the central Nestorian objection that the defenders of 
Chalcedon and Constantinople II cannot offer valid analogies for their under-
standing of the incarnation. However, in-depth analysis of Contra Nestorianos 
suggests that this is not the case and that Leontius sets out a radically different 
model according to which the soul is divine in the strict sense of the word and has 
a genetic relationship with the divinity as its progenitor in very much the same way 
as the divine Son does. 
                                                 
 
1
 Leontius of Jerusalem, Capita triginta contra Monophysitas, PG 86, 1769-1901 (CPG 6917); 
Contra Nestorianos, PG 86, 1399-1768i (CPG 6918), in the following abbreviated to CN. 
 
2
 See A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche, vol. 2, pt. 2: Die Kirche von 
Konstantinopel im 6. Jahrhundert (Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 1989), pp. 291-328, with a survey of 
earlier secondary literature. See also C. dell’Orso, Cristo e Logos. Il calcedonesimo del VI secolo 
in oriente (Rome 2010), pp. 348-73. 
 
3
 See my article “Divine self-invention: Leontius of Jerusalem’s reinterpretation of the Patristic 
model of the Christian God,” Journal of Theological Studies, 57 (2006), pp. 526-45. 
 
4
 See e.g. F. Gahbauer, Das anthropologische Modell. Ein Beitrag zur Christologie der frühen 
Kirche bis Chalcedon (Würzburg, 1984). 
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 It is evident that this interpretation of the anthropological paradigm permits a 
much more effective proof than the conventional version. Yet this advantage comes 
at a high cost because Leontius’ position is completely at odds with established 
doctrine. In the last part of my article I will make the case that Leontius started 
from the Origenist notion of the soul of Christ, which is consubstantial with all 
other souls, but that he then identified this soul with the divinity of the Son as one 
part of the composite Christ, with the consequence that all other souls were also 
elevated to the status of divine beings; and I will further discuss why he could 
voice such startlingly heterodox ideas only a few decades after Origenism had 
been declared a heresy. 
 Unlike Leontius’ speculation about the Trinity, which is set out concisely and 
unequivocally in a single chapter of Contra Nestorianos, his views on the human 
soul must be gleaned from a number of passages most of which make use of 
terminology that is open to interpretation. Therefore I shall look at all available 
evidence and assess in each case whether statements that characterise the soul as 
divine should be taken seriously or whether they should not rather be dismissed as 
rhetorical flourishes. And I shall further ask what implications either of these 
possible interpretations would have for the Christological argument, which the 
anthropological paradigm is intended to support. 
 The first passage I would like to consider is chapter seven of the first book of 
Contra Nestorianos. As is his wont Leontius first quotes a passage from a lost 
Nestorian treatise, which challenges the Chalcedonian concept of a hypostatic 
union of God and man in the incarnated Christ, and then proceeds to its refutation. 
In this case the Nestorian bases his argument on the axiomatic statement that “the 
difference between what is uncreated and what is created prevents naturally the 
union in a hypostasis” (ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ τοῦ κτιστοῦ τὴν καθ’ ὑπό-
στασιν φυσικῶς κωλύει ἕνωσιν).5  Leontius’ response reads as follows: 
 
∆ιὰ τί δὲ ἄρα κωλύει τὴν καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἕνωσιν φυσικῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ 
κτιστοῦ ἡ διαφορά; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῇ θατέρου προϋπάρξει ὡς μὴ δυναμένου τινὸς 
συνάπτεσθαι τῇ μὴ συμπροσελθούσῃ αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ εἶναι φύσει, ἄρα γε οὐδὲ τῷ 
πλασθέντι πρῶτον σώματι ᾿Αδὰμ τὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἡνώθη· εἰ δὲ 
αὐτὴ ὅλως ἡ κατὰ φύσεως λόγον παραλλαγὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἀσύμβατον εἰς ἕνωσιν 
τούτοις, οὐδὲ ἄρα τι ζῷον ἔσται ἐξ ἀοράτου καὶ ὁρατῆς φύσεως, ἢ θνητῆς καὶ 
ἀθανάτου, φθαρτῆς καὶ ἀφθάρτου· οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος εἷς 
ὢν τὴν καθ’ ὑπόστασιν.6 
 
“Why then does the difference between what is uncreated and what is created pre-
vent naturally the union in a hypostasis? If it (sc. prevented it) because of the pre-
existence of one part as if something could not be connected with a nature that does 
not come into being together with it, then the divine inbreathing, too, would not have 
been united in a hypostasis with the body of Adam, which had been fashioned first; 
and if the very difference in the definition of nature by itself causes their inability 
to come together in a union, then there would also be no living being made up of an 
invisible and a visible nature, or of a mortal and an immortal one, or of a corruptible 
                                                 
 
5
 CN, I.27, PG, 86, 1493A9-10. 
 
6
 CN, I.27, PG, 86, 1493B4-12. 
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and an incorruptible one, as for example the human being made up of soul and body, 
which is one as regards the hypostasis.” 
 
 In this passage Leontius identifies two reasons that might have prompted his 
adversary to formulate his axiom that an uncreated nature cannot be compounded 
with a created nature. The first is that the two parts did not come into existence 
simultaneously at the moment of their composition, the second that they differ in 
their natural make-up. Accordingly his counter-argument is an attempt to show that 
these facts are no obstacles to a hypostatic union. In order to achieve his aim he 
twice has recourse to the anthropological paradigm. In the first case he points out 
that Adam’s body had already been created before it was hypostatically united 
with the vivifying breath of God; and in the second case he argues that body and 
soul form a single hypostasis despite possessing diametrically opposite qualities. 
 It is immediately evident that this strategy is far from persuasive. The second 
argument seems to miss the crucial point: the Nestorian had not maintained that 
any difference in nature was an obstacle to a union, but had focused on the specific 
difference between created and uncreated being. However, according to official 
doctrine the human soul was a creature just like the human body. And the first 
argument appears to be even weaker: while Adam’s body may have been created 
before it became ensouled, it had obviously only existed for a short time and can 
therefore not serve as a genuine parallel for the eternal divine Word that assumed 
the flesh. Moreover, the human body belongs to the material sphere and is therefore 
even less like the divine Word than the immaterial human soul. It is evident that 
the parallel would have been much closer if Leontius had set out a scenario where 
the soul pre-exists the body. And this is in fact what he has done in the previous 
chapter: there he uses the union of the disembodied souls with their resurrected 
bodies as a parallel for the union of the pre-existing Word with the flesh.7 Even 
this analogy, however, is not perfect because in this case the bodies are not created 
but re-created and had formerly been united with the souls. 
 As contemporary readers would undoubtedly have known there existed a further 
scenario that provided a much closer match for the incarnation: according to this 
scenario Adam’s soul had already existed before its initial union with the body. 
Yet the same readers would also have been aware that this alternative was no longer 
viable after the condemnation of Origen at the Second Council of Constantinople 
in 553. 
 Since Leontius studiously avoids any reference to the pre-existence of the soul, 
one might conclude that he toed the official line. Indeed, the statement that “the 
divine inbreathing was united in a hypostasis with the body of Adam that had been 
fashioned first” (τῷ πλασθέντι πρῶτον σώματι ᾿Αδὰμ τὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα καθ’ ὑπό-
στασιν ἡνώθη) appears to be deliberately anti-Origenist. At the time when Leontius 
wrote his treatise it was staunch Nestorians such as Babai the Great who insisted 
on the pre-existence of the body whereas theologians with Origenist leanings such 
as Maximus the Confessor claimed that body and soul were created simultaneous-
ly.8 However, Leontius’ statement is less clear-cut than it first seems. Unlike Babai 
                                                 
 
7
 CN I.26, PG, 86, 1492D10-14. 
 
8
 See Babai the Great, Liber de Unione, c. 10, tr. A. A. Vaschalde (CSCO, 80, Scriptores Syri, 
35; Leuven, 1953), p. 90, ll. 1-4: Scriptura nobis exposuit illum primum in omnibus membris suis 
JLARC 4 (2010) 43-67 
Dirk Krausmüller, “Human Souls as Consubstantial Sons of God: The Heterodox Anthropo-
logy of Leontius of Jerusalem,” in: Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture  4 (2010) 




the Great who states unequivocally in his Liber de Unione that Adam’s soul was 
created in the pre-existing body he merely speaks of the endowment of Adam’s 
body with the soul. Moreover, he expresses this notion in a rather idiosyncratic 
manner. Taking as his starting point Genesis 2:7: “and God formed man as dust 
from the earth and breathed into his face a breath of life and man was turned into a 
living soul” (καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν 
εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), he 
rephrases this verse in such a way that it now corresponds to traditional definitions 
of the human being as “the soul … that has been united in a hypostasis with the 
body” (ἡ ψυχή ... καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένη τῷ σώματι).9 The obvious consequence 
of this reformulation is the replacement of “the soul” (ἡ ψυχή) with “the divine 
inbreathing” (τὸ θεῖον ἐμφύσημα), which sends a clear signal to the readers that 
these two terms refer to one and the same reality. 
 Leontius makes this substitution without further ado and thus gives the impres-
sion that what he says is completely above board. However, there can be no doubt 
that it would have been roundly rejected in the theological circles to which Leont-
ius’ Nestorian adversary belonged. Representatives of the Antiochene tradition such 
as Diodore of Tarsus, John Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrus had made a careful 
distinction between the “inbreathing” and the human soul, which they considered 
to be created out of nothing, and Babai the Great was still propounding this position 
at the beginning of the seventh century when he stated in his Liber de Unione that 
“the angels … realised that God who breathed into Adam and created the soul … 
had created for them, too, rational life out of nothing” (angeli … intellexerunt quod 
Deus, qui in Adam inspiravit et creavit animam … etiam ipsis creavit vitam ratio-
nalem ex nihilo).10 These authors were clearly troubled by the fact that Genesis 2:7 
does not clearly distinguish between God’s act of breathing into Adam’s face and 
the presence in Adam of a soul as its result and therefore took great pains to read 
this distinction into the text. In the fourth century Diodore of Tarsus averred that 
Moses “says that the divine inbreathing is the creative cause of it (sc. of the soul)” 
(ἐμφύσημα θεῖον δημιουργικὸν αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] εἶναί φησιν),11 and a similar 
position is still expressed in a Pseudo-Athanasian text from the seventh or eighth 
century, the Liber de Definitionibus, which states that “the inbreathing created a 
soul in the human being” (τὸ δὲ ἐμφύσημα ἐκεῖνο ψυχὴν ἐδημιούργησεν ἐν τῷ 
ἀνθρώπῳ).12 
 Leontius evidently takes the diametrically opposite approach when he identifies 
the two terms. What are the implications of such a move? The Antiochene authors 
whom I have just mentioned state that they responded to exegetes who concluded 
from the ambiguous wording of Genesis 2:7 “that the divine inbreathing had be-
                                                                                                                                     
formatum et corporatum fuisse, et deinde exposuit creationem animae in eo; and Maximus, Ambigua, 
PG, 91, 1321D-1325C. 
 
9
 Anastasius the Sinaïte, Capita vi adversus monotheletas, 9.1, ed. K.-H. Uthemann, Anastasii 
Siinaitae sermones duo in constitutionem hominis secundum imaginem Dei necnon opuscula adversus 
monotheletas (Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, 12; Turnhout, 1985). 
 
10
 Babai the Great, Liber de Unione, ch. 10, tr. A. Vaschalde, p. 90, ll. 17-21. 
 
11
 Catenae Graecae in Genesim et Exodum, II, Collectio Coisliniana in Genesim, ed. F. Petit 
(Corpus Christianorum, Series graeca, 15, Turnhout, Leuven, 1986), * 83 (Diodore), p. 86, ll. 9-12. 
12Pseudo-Athanasius, Liber de definitionibus, ch. 7, PG, 28, 545D7-10. 
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come the immortal soul” (τὸ ἐμφύσημα τοῦ θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον);13 
and Cyril of Alexandria who preferred to interpret the “inbreathing” as an additional 
endowment of the already complete human being Adam with the Holy Spirit also 
makes reference to the alternative view “that the inbreathing that had come forth 
from the divine substance … became a soul for the living being” (τὸ ἐκ τῆς θείας 
οὐσίας προελθὸν ἐμφύσημα, ψυχήν … γενέσθαι τῷ ζῴῳ).14 
 The advantages of such a position for a theologian in Leontius’ situation are 
immediately obvious. If he had claimed that the soul was divine, he would have 
been able to counter his adversary’s argument even more effectively than if he had 
had recourse to a model according to which the soul pre-existed the body, but was 
nevertheless a created being. Since countless human souls are hypostatically united 
with created material bodies, there could then be no conceivable reason why a 
hypostatic union between an uncreated and a created being should be impossible 
in the specific case of the divine Word. 
 However, is this really the message that Leontius wishes to convey? At first sight 
this seems utterly out of the question. After all, belief in the soul’s full divinity, as 
expressed in Pseudo-Justin’s De Resurrectione where the soul is called “part … and 
inbreathing of God” (μέρος … τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα),15 was roundly rejected by 
mainstream Christians, not only because it blurred the difference between creator 
and creation but also because it made God subject to division and change. 
 Therefore one might be tempted to conclude that Leontius applied the term “in-
breathing” (ἐμφύσημα) to the soul in a much vaguer fashion that did not call into 
question its status as a creature, especially since there were respectable precedents 
for such use: Cyril of Alexandria, for example, characterises the soul as “image and 
inbreathing of God” (εἰκὼν θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα) and then adds that one must for 
this reason take care of one’s soul and raise it up “to its creative cause” (πρὸς τὴν 
αἰτίαν αὐτῆς τὴν δημιουργικήν).16 Accordingly it could be argued that Leontius 
held the same view as Cyril and the absence of a similar corrective in his text could 
be explained through a lack of awareness of the problems arising from a straight-
forward equation of the divine inbreathing and the human soul. If this were the case 
we would need to return to our original assessment of the passage and would be 
forced to conclude that the arguments put forward by Leontius fail to address the 
issues raised by his Nestorian adversary. 
 There is only one way to establish which of the two proposed interpretations is 
correct: we need to analyse further passages in Contra Nestorianos where Leontius 
sets out his views about the origin of the human soul. The first passage which I will 
consider is found in the first chapter of book one, where Leontius is confronted with 
the Nestorians’ claim that the soul as part of the human composite is by necessity 
itself made up of parts. In order to refute this claim Leontius points out that if this 
were true for “that which is intelligible and spiritual and like to angels and further-
more also in the image of God and an inbreathing of the glory of the almighty” 
                                                 
 
13
 Catenae Graecae in Genesim et Exodum, II, ed. Petit, * 83 (Diodore), p. 86, ll. 2-3.  
 
14




 Pseudo-Justin, De resurrectione, PG, 6, 1588Α3-4. 
 
16
 Cyril of Alexandria, Die Matthäus-Kommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, ed. J. Reuss 
(TU, 61; Berlin, 1957), pp. 153-269, fragment, 81, l. 7. 
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(τὸ νοερὸν καὶ πνευματικὸν καὶ ἰσάγγελον ἔτι μὴν καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ 
ἐμφύσημα τῆς δόξης τοῦ παντοκράτορος), it would also be true for the divine 
archetype, which then permits him to accuse his opponent of blasphemy.17 
 At first sight the characterisation of the human soul as “in the image of God” 
(κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ) and as “inbreathing” (ἐμφύσημα), based on Genesis 1:26 “let us 
make man according to our image” (ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν), 
and on Genesis 2:7 “God … breathed into his face the breath of life” (ὁ θεός … 
ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς), seems unexceptional: after all, 
we have just come across the almost identical phrase “image and inbreathing of 
God” (εἰκὼν θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα) in Cyril of Alexandria. However, a closer look 
reveals that the two verses from Genesis are not the only Biblical passages to which 
Leontius makes reference because the qualification of the inbreathing as “of the 
glory of the almighty” (τῆς δόξης τοῦ παντοκράτορος) is clearly based on the 
second part of the formula “outflow of the glory of the almighty” (ἀπόρροια τῆς 
τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης) in Wisdom 7:25, a connection that is further emphasised 
by the adjectives “intellectual and spiritual” (νοερὸν καὶ πνευματικόν), which 
closely resemble the phrase “intellectual spirit” (πνεῦμα νοερόν) in Wisdom 7:22. 
The result of this conflation is evident: the replacement of ἀπόρροια with ἐμφύσημα 
insinuates equivalence between the two terms, which can only mean that Leontius 
expects his readers not only to equate the soul with God’s “inbreathing”, but also 
to conceive of this inbreathing as an emanation of the divinity. 
 Does this additional evidence permit us to affirm that Leontius thought human 
souls to be fully divine? Unfortunately, the answer must still be no. Use of the term 
ἀπόρροια in protological contexts is not uncommon in Christian literature of earlier 
centuries. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, had referred to the mind as “the outflow 
from the divine inbreathing” (ἡ ἐκ τοῦ θείου ἐμφυσήματος ἀπόρροια).18 Gregory 
of Nazianzus had claimed that the human souls “were a part … of God and had 
flowed from above” (μοῖραν ... ὄντας θεοῦ καὶ ἄνωθεν ῥεύσαντας).19 In the early 
seventh century such phrases were, of course, considered unacceptable because of 
their Origenist overtones but this does not necessarily mean that they were intrins-
ically heretical: after all, neither of the two Cappadocian authors had ever believed 
that human souls were an effluence of the divine substance. 
 At this point one might therefore conclude that Leontius may well have held 
heterodox views about the origin of the soul but that the ambiguities inherent in 
the terms and concepts used by him make it impossible to arrive at any certainty. 
However, there are other passages in Contra Nestorianos where Leontius is less 
guarded and where he does indeed confirm that the souls are consubstantial with 
their “father” God. I will start the discussion with chapter nineteen of book four, 
which addresses the Nestorian claim that Mary cannot be called “God-bearer” be-
cause the Son of God is engendered by his consubstantial Father and can therefore 
not experience a second birth from a human mother in the incarnation. Leontius 
points out that the Son has two “partial” (ἐκ μέρους) progenitors, one “according 
to being” (κατὰ τὸ εἶναι) and one “according to qualified being” (κατὰ τὸ τοιῶσδε 
                                                 
 
17
 CN, I.1, PG, 86, 1405D-1408A. 
 
18
 Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarem, ed. F. Müller, Gregorii Nysseni Opera, 
III.1: Opera dogmatica minora, (Leiden, 1958), p. 146, l. 26. 
 
19
 Gregory of Nazianzus, De pauperum amore, PG, 35, 865B12. 
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εἶναι) when he becomes incarnated, and then proceeds to support his argument 
with the anthropological paradigm: 
 
Ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου ὁρῶμεν, τοῦ μὲν σώματος τὴν γέννησιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐκ τῶν 
γονέων ἔχοντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐκ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἁπλῶς – τοῦτο γὰρ ἔχει ἐκ Θεοῦ ὡς 
καὶ ὁ πρωτόπλαστος Ἀδάμ –, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ σὺν τῷ διαπλασθέντι αὐτῇ εἶναι σώματι, 
οὗ καὶ χωρὶς δύναται εἶναι· λαμβάνει γὰρ τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τοῦ μὲν σώμ-
ατος αἰτίων, αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νυμφοστόλων μόνον· καὶ ὅμως τῶν φύσεων ὡς 
ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου κυρίως τε καὶ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν οἱ αὐτοὶ λέγονται τοκέες. Τί οὖν ὑμᾶς 
τὰ ἐξ ἀπιστίας φιμοῖ βομβήματα, Θεὸν μὴ λέγειν ὀρθῶς τὸν τεχθέντα σεσαρκωμένον 
Λόγον; ἡνίκα καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν σαρκωθεῖσαν ἀνενδοιάστως ὁμολογεῖτε γεγεννῆσθαι 
ἐκ τῶν τοῦ εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς αἰτίων καὶ σὺν τῷ σώματι τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ αὐτῆς τοκέας 
ὀνομάζετε;20 
 
“As we see with the human being who has from the parents the birth of the body into 
being whereas (sc. he has from them the birth) of the soul not simply into being – for it 
has this (sc. the being) from God, just as also the first-formed Adam –, but into being 
with the body that has been shaped for it, which (sc. the soul) can also be without, 
for he takes this from those who are so-to-speak the causes of the body, but only the 
escorts of the soul itself, and these same ones are nevertheless called properly and 
truly parents of the natures as of one human being. Why then do the buzzings arising 
from disbelief gag you so as not to say correctly that the born incarnated Word is God, 
when you admit without hesitation that the incarnated soul is born from the causes 
of the being of the flesh and you call the same together with the body also parents of 
it (sc. the soul)?” 
 
 Despite the convoluted phrasing the thrust of the argument is clear. Ordinary 
human beings are called mothers and fathers although strictly speaking they are 
only the causes for the “being” (εἶναι) of the bodies of their offspring whereas the 
souls owe their “being” (εἶναι) to God and the human “parents” are only the causes 
of the “qualified being” (τοιῶσδε εἶναι) of souls insofar as they bring about their 
embodied state. Therefore Mary can justly be called “mother of God” despite the 
fact that she is only the cause for the “being” (εἶναι) of the Word’s human body 
because she effects the “incarnate being” (σεσαρκωμένως εἶναι) of his divinity, 
which in its previous non-incarnated state had received its “being” (εἶναι) from the 
divine Father. It is evident that Leontius strives to create a close parallel between 
the two cases and that he achieves his aim by assimilating the human compound 
to the incarnated Word. This strategy results in an anthropology with a strongly 
heterodox flavour. For example, the distinction that he makes between the “soul as 
such” (ἁπλῶς ψυχή) and the “incarnated soul” (σαρκωθεῖσα ψυχή) implies that 
like the Word the disembodied soul existed before its composition with a body. 
Even more suggestive, however, is Leontius’ claim that God is the cause of “being” 
(εἶναι) of both the Word and the human souls because it raises the possibility that 
the two relationships are equivalent. 
 In order to establish whether this is indeed the case we need to turn to other 
arguments based on the anthropological paradigm. In chapter four of book three 
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Leontius applies the framework that we have just reconstructed to the specific case 
of Adam but with the added twist that the relationship between God and Adam’s 
soul is now described in genetic terms: 
 
∆ιορατέον οὖν σαφῶς ὡς καὶ ταύτην τὴν μερικὴν αἰτίαν καὶ μερικὴν ὁμοιότητα 
μόνον θεωρήσας Λουκᾶς ὁ εὐαγγελιστὴς ἐνοῦσαν καὶ τῷ ᾿Αδὰμ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα 
τῶν πνευμάτων - κατὰ γὰρ ψυχὴν μόνον προσεχὴς αἴτιος αὐτῷ ἦν ὁ θεὸς ἐμφυσῶν 
αὐτῷ πνεῦμα ζωῆς εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν †ὅπερ† καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ γῆς προδιέπλασε - 
καὶ κατὰ ταύτην σωζόμενον μόνον τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 
εἰδὼς ἐκ μερικῆς αἰτίας καὶ ὁμοιώσεως υἱὸν σαφῶς τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν πνευμάτων 
θεοῦ καὶ τὸν ᾿Αδὰμ ἐγενεαλόγησεν οὕτως ἀνατάξας καὶ εἶπεν εἶναι τοῦ ᾿Αδὰμ τοῦ 
θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἔφη· τοῦ Σὴθ τοῦ ᾿Αδὰμ ἤγουν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ᾿Αδάμ· καὶ γὰρ εἶπε· τοῦ 
᾿Ισαὰκ <τοῦ ᾿Αβραάμ> ὅπερ ὁ Ματθαῖος ἔλεγεν· ᾿Αβραὰμ ἐγέννησε τὸν ᾿Ισαὰκ 
οὕτως ἔφη· τοῦ ᾿Αδὰμ τοῦ θεοῦ.21 
“One must, then, clearly see that Luke, too, only considered that partial cause and 
partial similarity with the father of the spirits to be inherent in Adam, too, – for only 
as regards the soul was God his direct cause by breathing into him spirit of life so 
as to be a living soul just as he also shaped beforehand the body from earth – and 
that he knew that only as regards this (sc. the soul) the divine image and likeness is 
preserved for the human being, when in a genealogy he clearly called Adam, too, the 
son of God ‘the father of spirits’, having thus arranged it, and when he said that he is 
‘Adam of God’, just as he said ‘Seth of Adam’, that is to say: ‘the one out of Adam’, 
for he also said ‘Isaac <of Abraham>’, what Matthew expressed as ‘Abraham begat 
Isaac’. In this way he said ‘Adam of God’.” 
 In this passage Leontius repeats his claim that God is the “direct cause” (προσ-
εχὴς αἴτιος) only of Adam’s soul but not of his body, which is fashioned from 
earth.22 However, this basic configuration is now elaborated through recourse to 
the formula “father of the spirits” (πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων) from Hebrews 12:9 
where “spirits” was traditionally understood to refer to human souls.23 Examination 
of the context shows that Leontius takes great pains to read this relationship into 
the Biblical text. Taking as his starting point Genesis 2:7: “he breathed into his face 
a breath of life and man became a living soul” (ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ 
πνοὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), he replaces πνοὴν ζωῆς 
with πνεῦμα ζωῆς and omits the intervening καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος in order to 
signal that the inbreathing is at the same time a spirit and Adam’s soul. Above all, 
however, he consistently emphasises the genetic character of the relationship be-
tween God and human souls. This is already evident in his decision to complement 
the Biblical term “father” (πατήρ) with “son” (υἱός) and becomes even more ob-
vious when we analyse his interpretation of the phrase “of Adam of God” (τοῦ 
᾿Αδὰμ τοῦ θεοῦ), which he borrows from Christ’s genealogy in Luke 3:38. Leontius 
starts by pointing out that in Luke’s text there is strict equivalence between the 
relationship between Adam and God on the one hand and the relationships between 
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Christ’s human ancestors on the other: in each case a simple genitive is used. In a 
second step he then expands Luke’s statement that Seth is “of Adam” (τοῦ ᾿Αδάμ) 
to “out of Adam” (ἐκ τοῦ ᾿Αδάμ). This, however, must not be understood as the 
introduction of a distinction between human fathers and God as “father of spirits” 
(πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων) but rather as encouragement to the reader to make the 
same modification in the parallel statement and to expand it to “Adam out of God” 
(᾿Αδὰμ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ). A similar strategy is employed in the immediately following 
statement which creates a parallel between the genealogy in the Gospel of Luke and 
its counterpart in the Gospel of Matthew where the relationship between Christ’s 
forefathers, the first of whom is in this case Abraham, is expressed through the verb 
“begat” (ἐγέννησε). Leontius points out that the statement “Isaac <of Abraham>” 
(᾿Ισαὰκ <τοῦ ᾿Αβραάμ>) in Luke 3:34 corresponds to “Abraham begat Isaac” (᾿Αβ-
ραὰμ ἐγέννησε τὸν ᾿Ισαάκ) in Matthew 1:2, and then adds “in this way he said: ‘of 
Adam of God’” (οὕτως ἔφη· τοῦ ᾿Αδὰμ τοῦ θεοῦ). This gives a clear signal to the 
readers that they should rephrase Luke’s expression “Adam of God” (᾿Αδὰμ τοῦ 
θεοῦ), which does not have a counterpart in Matthew, as “God begat Adam” (ὁ 
θεὸς ἐγέννησε τὸν ᾿Αδάμ). 
 It goes without saying that this argument is problematic because according to 
Leontius the relationship between Adam and God is not identical with the relation-
ships between Christ’s human ancestors: as we have seen in the latter case the 
genetic link is limited to their bodies. However, this does not mean that we can 
simply dismiss it for it provides clear evidence for Leontius’ belief that terms like 
“father” (πατήρ), “son” (υἱός) and “begetting” (γεννᾶν) must be taken literally 
when they refer to God and Adam’s soul. I would therefore argue that the phrase 
“out of God” (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ) has the meaning “out of the substance of God” (ἐκ τῆς 
οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ) and that the divine substance is the counterpart of the sperm of 
the father and the blood of the mother as the material causes of the bodies of their 
children. 
 In chapter four of book three Leontius does not use the term “consubstantiality” 
(ὁμοουσιότης), but only speaks more vaguely about the “similarity” (ὁμοιότης) 
between God and the soul. However, analysis of the first chapter of the second 
book shows that he is not always so circumspect. There he is confronted with the 
axiom that “consubstantial beings do not wish to be consubstantial in part” (τὰ 
ὁμοούσια οὐκ ἐκ μέρους θέλει ὁμοούσια εἶναι),24 which permits his Nestorian ad-
versary to reject the doctrine of a composite Christ who is consubstantial with the 
divine Father in his divinity and consubstantial with Mary in his humanity. In his 
refutation Leontius has again recourse to the anthropological paradigm: 
 
Καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἐκ μέρους τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσεως τῆς μητρὸς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ 
πατρὸς ἔτι μὴν καὶ ᾿Αβραὰμ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν στοιχούντων τοῖς ἴχνεσι τῆς πίστεως 
αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ γεννῶντος τὸ πνεῦμα υἱός ἐστι· καὶ ἐκ μέρους τῆς 
μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, ἥ ἐστι πάντα τάδε, ὁμοούσιός ἐστι τούτοις πᾶσιν.25 
 
“For one human being is in part of his own hypostasis of his mother and his father, 
and also of Abraham, the father of those who follow the footsteps of faith, and of 
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the spirit that begets the spirit, and he is in each part of the one hypostasis, which is 
all these, consubstantial with all those.” 
 
 Here Leontius distinguishes between three different “progenitors” of a human 
being – the natural parents, Abraham as the father of the faithful, and “the spirit” 
(τὸ πνεῦμα) –, which are each consubstantial with a “part” (μέρος) of the human 
hypostasis. The phrase “son of the spirit that begets the spirit” (τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ 
γεννῶντος τὸ πνεῦμα υἱός), which expresses the last-named relationship, is based 
on John 3:6 where Christ avers that “what is born out of the spirit is spirit” (τὸ γε-
γεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστιν). Thus we have a close counterpart to 
chapter four of book three where Leontius has recourse to the similar verse Hebrews 
12:9 and where he also adds the term “son” (υἱός) to emphasise the genetic relation. 
Moreover, the human “spirit” (πνεῦμα) is again part of the human compound and 
therefore cannot refer to an additional endowment with the Holy Spirit but must be 
equated with the soul. This allows us to conclude that Leontius wishes his readers 
to decode the phrase “son of the spirit that begets the spirit” (τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ 
γεννῶντος τὸ πνεῦμα υἱός) as “son of God who begets the soul” (τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ 
γεννῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν υἱός) and then to realise that use of the same appellation 
establishes consubstantiality between the divine progenitor and its offspring. 
 Accordingly, the human parents should then again only be causes of the body. 
In the first chapter of the second book this point is not made explicit but it can be 
inferred from the Biblical reference text and from other related passages. In John 
3:6 the statement about the spirit is complemented with a statement about the flesh, 
“what is born out of the flesh is flesh” (τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκός σάρξ ἐστιν). 
The term “flesh” is ambiguous since it can refer to the complete human being, but 
in the passage under discussion there can be no doubt that it only denotes the body. 
This can be seen from chapter seven of book four where we find another list of 
three progenitors of a human being, in this case the Biblical personage Timothy: 
Paul who converted him to Christianity, “his father according to the flesh” (ὁ … κατὰ 
σάρκα αὐτοῦ πατήρ), and God as “the cause of all substance” (πάσης οὐσίας αἴτιος) 
and “father of all” (πάντων … πατήρ). This is evidently the same configuration as 
we have found in the first chapter of book two. However, in this case Leontius adds 
the clarification: “The first begot him as a similar one according to faith, the second 
according to his body, and the third according to his image” (ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν τῇ πίστει, ὁ 
δὲ τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐγέννησεν αὐτὸν ὅμοιον, ὁ δὲ τῇ εἰκόνι αὐτοῦ).26 
 The substitution of “flesh” (σάρξ) with the unequivocal “body” (σῶμα) shows 
clearly that the former term, too, refers solely to the physical aspect of a human 
being.27 Thus we can conclude that Leontius had developed a consistent framework, 
which he then repeatedly reproduced in his treatise Contra Nestorianos. 
 So far we have focused on two genetic relationships, one between God and the 
human souls, and one between the bodies of human parents and the bodies of their 
children, both of which establish consubstantiality. This juxtaposition is evidently 
at the centre of Leontius’ argument, because it permits him to point to the human 
                                                 
 
26
 CN, IV.7, PG, 86, 1664D1-3. 
 
27
 Indeed, the same point can be made as regards the phrase “the father of the spirits” (ὁ πατὴρ 
τῶν πνευμάτων) because in Hebrews 12:9 it is juxtaposed with “our fathers of the flesh” (οἱ τῆς 
σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρες). 
JLARC 4 (2010) 43-67 
Dirk Krausmüller, “Human Souls as Consubstantial Sons of God: The Heterodox Anthropo-
logy of Leontius of Jerusalem,” in: Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture  4 (2010) 




compound as a parallel for the composite Christ. However, in the first chapter of 
the second book and in chapter seven of book four this straightforward picture is 
complicated by an additional reference to Abraham and Paul where the relation-
ship is clearly not genetic. In order to understand why Leontius mentions these 
two figures we need to consider the position of his adversary: the Nestorian had 
referred to Abraham and Paul in order to support his claim that when the Bible 
speaks of more than one “father” of a human being, the additional “fathers” are 
not further progenitors, because the term is merely used as a metaphor. I would 
therefore suggest that Leontius intends to subvert this distinction by focusing on 
the fact that Abraham and Paul are human beings and therefore consubstantial with 
all other human beings, even if they are not their direct progenitors. By doing so 
he could remove one of the mainstays of the Nestorian’s argument, namely that 
when Scripture describes the relationship between the human being Jesus and the 
divine Father in genetic terms, this must also be discounted as metaphorical speech.28 
 Indeed, the assertion that souls are consubstantial with God can also be under-
stood as a response to a Nestorian argument. In chapter thirty-two of book four the 
Nestorian concludes from John 3:6 that an ordinary Christian is an adoptive son of 
God through baptism and instruction and “is not begotten out of the substance of 
the begetter” (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας οὐ γεννᾶται τοῦ γεννῶντος), and that in the special 
case of the incarnation the man Jesus can therefore only be endowed with the Spirit 
but not be compounded with the Word. In order to counter this argument Leontius 
clearly felt the need to identify the “spirit” with the soul, which is hypostatically 
united with the body and can thus provide an analogy for the composition of the 
divine nature and the human nature in the incarnation.29 
 With his insistence on a genetic relationship between God and the human souls, 
which establishes their consubstantiality, Leontius deviates radically from the 
Christian mainstream. Earlier exegetes of Hebrews 12:9 had stressed that in this 
case fatherhood cannot be understood in the strict sense of the word: in his Com-
mentary on Isaiah Cyril states that the formula “father of the spirits” (πατὴρ τῶν 
πνευμάτων) does not mean that God “has given birth out of his own nature” (ὡς 
ἐξ ἰδίας φύσεως τετοκώς), as he did when he brought forth the Son and the Holy 
Spirit, but merely informs us that the souls come into existence from him “by way 
of creation” (δημιουργικῶς).30 This raises the question: how does Leontius conceive 
of the relationship between the soul and the divine Word? In order to find an answer 
I will now turn to chapter eighteen of book one. There Leontius is confronted with 
the Nestorian claim that the salvation of mankind is achieved through the “good 
pleasure” (εὐδοκία) of the divine Word and the “mediation” (μεσιτεία) of the man 
Jesus and that it is therefore unnecessary to posit a composition of the substance 
of the Word with the substance of a human being. In order to refute this position 
Leontius draws a parallel with creation. He starts by pointing out that God did not 
hesitate to create Adam’s body “through immediate action” (διὰ τῆς αὐτουργίας) 
and that there is therefore no reason why he should not have personally recreated 
the fallen human being.31 This is a traditional theme, which is found in writings of 
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both Alexandrian and Antiochene writers who emphasise that human beings are 
privileged over all other creatures because they owe their existence to a direct act 
of God.32 However, it does little for Leontius’ argument that the relationship be-
tween God and Adam provides a parallel for the composition of the divine Word 
with a human nature. If we take God’s creation of Adam as a paradigm we only 
arrive at a scenario where the Word creates a human body for himself whereas the 
nature of the relationship between the Word and this body is left undefined. It is 
evident that in order to have an effective parallel for the incarnation Leontius would 
need to show that the soul in the composite “Adam” corresponds to the divine Word 
in the composite “Christ”; and this is indeed what he does in the following passage: 
 
Ἔτι δὲ μηδὲ κατ’ εἰκόνα ἰδίαν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦτον προαγαγεῖν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον χαρ-
ακτῆρα ἐν τῷ χοϊκῷ καταβιβάζειν φυράματι ἔτι δὲ μάλιστα μηδὲ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν 
καὶ πνοὴν ζωῆς τῷ ἰδίῳ ἐμφυσήματι ἐνιέναι αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ χοϊκῷ φυράματι) καὶ 
ἐνοικίζειν ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῷ πηλῷ καὶ ὥσπερ ἀρραβῶνα τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν (sc. 
τὸν θεόν) συνθέσεως καταβάλλεσθαι ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς 
σάρκα.33 
 
“Moreover, he would not have produced him according to his own image and like-
ness nor would he have caused his own imprint to descend into the earthly lump. 
And, above all, he would not have injected into him a living soul and breath of life 
through his own inbreathing and housed himself in the clay from the beginning and 
paid down as some earnest of the combination with it (sc. the clay) out of the own 
nature with the flesh from earth.” 
 
 In this passage Leontius has again recourse to the two Biblical accounts of the 
coming to be of Adam, Genesis 1:26: “Let us make man in our image and likeness” 
(ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν), and Genesis 
2:7: “And God formed man as dust from the earth and breathed into his face a 
breath of life and man became a living soul” (καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν). In his discussion of this latter verse Leontius makes 
an explicit link between the coming to be of Adam and the incarnation of the Word 
and he conceptualises the former in terms that go beyond a simple act of creation: 
as is evident from the statement “lodging himself” (ἐνοικίζειν ἑαυτόν) and from 
the prepositional phrase “out of his own nature” (ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως) it is 
the divinity itself that is infused into Adam, which creates an obvious link with 
John 1:14: “And the Word … took his abode in us” (καὶ ὁ λόγος … ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν 
ἡμῖν). This is clearly a scenario that would be reconcilable with the view that the 
human soul is of divine origin, which we have encountered in the previously dis-
cussed passages. In particular, the claim that God lodges “himself” (ἑαυτόν) in the 
“clay” (πηλός) and the juxtaposition of the two prepositional phrases “out of the 
own nature” (ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως) and “from earth” (ἀπὸ γῆς) resemble 
closely the statements we found in Leontius’s discussion of the two-fold consub-
stantiality of human beings. 
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 As in the passages that we have discussed so far this impression could be sub-
stantiated through detailed analysis of the argument. However, in this case I will 
not immediately turn to Leontius’ text but rather start by identifying the exegetical 
tradition, which provided the starting point for his reasoning, and then proceed to 
establish how he deviated from this tradition and why he did so. The previous dis-
cussion has only considered Patristic authors who took the statement “he breathed 
into his face a breath of life” (ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς) to 
be a reference to the infusion of the soul into Adam’s body because this is also how 
Leontius understands the term in all the passages that we have discussed so far. 
However, this was not the only possible interpretation of the first part of Genesis 
2:7. Alexandrian theologians made a sharp distinction between this statement and 
that which immediately followed: “and man became a living soul” (καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν). They argued that the inbreathing endowed Adam 
with the gift of the Holy Spirit, which was then lost or at least obscured through 
the fall and finally returned to human kind by Christ. This view was inspired by 
the striking similarity between Genesis 2:7 and John 20:22 where we are told that 
the resurrected Christ appeared in the midst of the Apostles, “breathed on them and 
said to them: ‘Take the Holy Spirit!’” (ἐνεφύσησεν καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· λάβετε πνεῦμα 
ἅγιον). The relation between the two verses is made explicit by many authors. Cyril 
of Alexandria, for example, states in his Commentary on the Gospel of John that 
“Christ again puts his own spirit into his own disciples” (κατοικίζει πάλιν τὸ ἴδιον 
πνεῦμα Χριστὸς τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς);34 and avers in his Glaphyra in Genesin that 
the “inbreathing” of Genesis 2:7 is an act by which God “immediately imprinted an 
incorruptible life-giving spirit” (ἄφθαρτον ζωοποιὸν εὐθὺς ἐνεχάραττε πνεῦμα).35 
 These authors not only express themselves in strikingly similar terms but also 
appear to have the same concerns as Leontius. They tend to emphasise that it is 
the very divinity and not some derivative entity that lodges itself in human beings. 
Gregory of Nyssa, for example, states that studious prayer ‘gives great gifts and 
houses the spirit itself in the souls’ (μεγάλα χαρίζεται καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ταῖς 
ψυχαῖς ἐνοικίζει).36 And Cyril of Alexandria is even more insistent on this point 
when he concludes in his treatise De sancta Trinitate that the Spirit transforms the 
believers “not as if through a servile grace” (οὐχ ὡς διὰ χάριτος ὑπουργικῆς) and 
denies that “the grace through it was somehow cordoned off from the substance of 
the Spirit” (τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πνεύματος διεσχοινισμένη τις ἦν ἡ δι’ αὐτοῦ χάρις). 
The similarity with Leontius’ agenda is obvious: as we have already seen he stress-
es that God installed “himself” (ἑαυτόν) in Adam and uses the phrase “out of his 
own nature” (ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως). 
 However, a closer look at chapter eighteen of book one reveals some obvious 
discrepancies between the positions of Leontius and of Cyril of Alexandria. First 
of all, Leontius identifies the “inbreathing” (ἐμφύσημα) not with the Spirit but 
with the Son. This is evident from the context: before he refers to God’s “own 
inbreathing” (ἴδιον ἐμφύσημα) he has already used the two phrases “own image” 
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 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarius in Iohannem, ed. Pusey, vol. 3, 135; see also Commentary 
on John, John 12:1, vol. 4, 1097E. 
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(εἰκὼν ἰδία) and “own imprint” (χαρακτὴρ ἴδιος), which had traditionally been 
taken to refer to the Son. Since Origen Christian authors had rephrased the Biblical 
formula “in our image” (κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν) and the following “in the image of 
God” (κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ) as “according to his own image” (κατ’ εἰκόνα ἰδίαν), 
thereby identifying the divine model for the human soul with the Son of God who 
in II Corinthians 4:4 is called the “image of God” (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ).37 And writers 
such as Athanasius of Alexandria had referred to the Son as the “own imprint” 
(ἴδιος χαρακτήρ) of the Father when they paraphrased the statement in Hebrews 
1:3 that the Son is the “imprint of his (sc. God’s) hypostasis” (χαρακτὴρ τῆς 
αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ θεοῦ] ὑποστάσεως).38 This suggests that Leontius deliberately 
created the series of the three statements in order to insinuate to his readers that he 
wished the last term not to be identified with the Spirit as was traditional but with 
the Son. The reason for this manipulation is evident: by substituting the Son for 
the Spirit Leontius was able to create a much closer parallel with the incarnation 
where the Son and not the Spirit became man. 
 A similar reworking of traditional themes can be detected from the way Leontius 
conceives of the entity with which the divine Son compounded himself. Here it is 
instructive to compare Leontius’ phrase “to inject a living soul and a breath of life 
into it (sc. the earthy mixture) through his own inbreathing and to house himself at 
the beginning in the mud” (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν καὶ πνοὴν ζωῆς τῷ ἰδίῳ ἐμφυσήματι 
ἐνιέναι αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ χοϊκῷ φυράματι] καὶ ἐνοικίζειν ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῷ πηλῷ) 
with a similar formula in Cyril’s De sancta trinitate, “housing and injecting the 
spirit into the souls of the faithful and refashioning them through it and in it to the 
form that they had at the beginning” (ταῖς τῶν πιστευόντων ψυχαῖς ἐγκατοικίζ-
οντός τε καὶ ἐνιέντος τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ μεταπλάττοντος εἰς 
εἶδος τὸ ἐν ἀρχαῖς).39 The difference is obvious: in Cyril’s case the divine element 
is infused into an already existing soul whereas Leontius mentions “living soul” 
(ψυχὴ ζῶσα) as an added feature. At this point one might argue that Leontius uses 
with “breath of life” (πνοὴ ζωῆς) a second term that might denote the Spirit as a 
further entity that was also infused into Adam’s body. However, against such an 
interpretation it must be pointed out that he makes no effort to distinguish between 
the two terms: he simply correlates them, although in the Biblical text they are part 
of two subsequent and quite distinct statements – “he breathed into his face a breath 
of life” (ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς) and “man became a 
living soul” (καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν) – and despite the fact 
that earlier theologians such as Cyril had insisted that the two statements needed to 
be kept apart. Indeed we have already seen that Leontius can replace the Biblical 
πνοή with πνεῦμα in the sense of “soul” when he rephrases Genesis 2:7 as 
“breathing into it a spirit of life so as to be a living soul” (ἐμφυσῶν αὐτῷ πνεῦμα 
ζωῆς εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν). Nevertheless there is no doubt that the term πνεῦμα here 
does not refer to the Holy Spirit but to the soul, which is mentioned immediately 
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afterwards.40 This suggests that here, too, “living soul” and “breath of life” are 
synonymous and that they both denote the soul and also the divinity, since they are 
taken up again by “himself” (ἑαυτόν). And in the same way we will then need to 
interpret the phrase “through his own inbreathing” (τῷ ἰδίῳ ἐμφυσήματι): Since it 
is equated with the divine Son it is also identical with the following reflexive 
pronoun and can therefore not be materially different from “breath of life” and 
“living soul”. Such interpretation would entail that for Leontius the recipient of 
the “inbreathing” is not the whole Adam, but merely Adam’s body. We have 
seen that he expresses this view in other parts of Contra Nestorianos and close 
examination of the passage under discussion reveals that this is also true in this 
particular case. He first speaks of “earthen lump” (χοϊκὸν φύραμα) and “clay” 
(πηλός), which can refer to the whole human being or to the body alone. 
However, such a reading is not possible for the statement that Christ created a 
precedent for his own composition by joining himself “to the flesh from earth” 
(πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα). This statement is evidently based on the first half of 
Genesis 2:7: “and God formed man as dust from the earth” (καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς). By qualifying “flesh” as being “from earth” (ἀπὸ 
γῆς) Leontius insinuates that “flesh” is to be identified with “dust” (χοῦς), which 
means that it must refer exclusively to the body.41 Therefore we can conclude that 
the “inbreathing”, now identified with the divine Son, enters a material body and 
becomes the soul of the human being Adam. 
 It is not difficult to see why Leontius strayed from the traditional “Alexandrian” 
position and substituted the soul for the Holy Spirit. While endowment with the 
Holy Spirit results in a scenario where the divine substance is present in human 
beings this presence is nevertheless not a part of human nature: it remains extrinsic 
to it and can even be lost. Therefore it cannot serve as a parallel for the divine Son 
if the incarnation is to be conceptualised as a composition and must be replaced 
by the soul as one part of the human composite. 
 The comparison of Leontius’ argument with traditional Alexandrian exegesis has 
given us a first insight into the origins of his conceptual framework. However, he 
was not only influenced by theologians with whom he felt a natural affinity; he was 
also indebted to the theology of his Antiochene or Nestorian enemies. This can be 
seen when we focus on the manner in which Leontius seeks to distinguish the 
coming to be of ordinary human beings from the incarnation of the Word. So far 
we have only considered similarities between the two events: we have seen that 
God lodges “himself” (ἑαυτόν) in Adam and that what he lodges there is “out of 
his own nature” (ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως), just as it will be the case in the later 
incarnation. However, Leontius also informs us how he wishes us to conceive of 
the relationship between the two events: he calls the ensouling of Adam a “pledge 
for the composition with him (sc. God)” (ἀρραβῶνα τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν [sc. τὸν θεόν] 
συνθέσεως). In its literal sense ἀρραβών refers to a partial payment that a purchaser 
offers as a security for the delivery of the whole sum that is owed by him,42 and 
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this meaning is preserved when the term is used in a metaphorical sense: Christian 
authors consistently interpret it as denoting a “part” (μέρος), which is “incomplete” 
(ἀτελές), and juxtapose it with the “whole” (ὅλον, πᾶν), which is “complete” (τέ-
λειον).43 Accordingly, we can rephrase “pledge out of his own nature” (ἀρραβῶνα 
… ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως) as “part out of his own nature” (μέρος … ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας 
φύσεως) and we can infer that in Christ’s humanity resides the “whole” (ὅλον) of 
the divinity. 
 How did Leontius arrive at this conceptual framework? His starting-point was 
evidently the Biblical formula “pledge of the Spirit” (ἀρραβὼν τοῦ πνεύματος).44 
Other Christian authors such as Gennadius of Constantinople had interpreted this 
formula as “the partial grace of the Spirit” (τὸ μερικὸν τοῦ πνεύματος χάρισμα) 
bestowed in the wake of the incarnation and had juxtaposed it with the “universal 
grace” (καθόλου χάρις) that will be given after the resurrection.45 Significantly, 
however, the same conceptual framework is employed by Antiochene theologians 
when they attempt to distinguish between Christ and other virtuous human beings. 
As I have already mentioned, the Nestorian author put a strong emphasis on the 
endowment of the man Jesus with the Holy Spirit, which then permitted him to 
claim that it was not necessary to conceive of the incarnation as a composition in 
order to safeguard the salvific effects of the incarnation. This endowment of Jesus 
with the Spirit, however, was conceived in quantitative terms: It was argued that 
Jesus received the whole Spirit whereas saintly human beings of earlier times only 
received a part of this Spirit. This notion is set out most concisely by Theodoret of 
Cyrus in his Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium where it is claimed that God 
distributed to the prophets the gifts of the Spirit, whereas in the incarnation he gave 
the “assumed nature” (προσληφεῖσα φύσις) not merely a “partial grace” (μερικὴ 
χάρις), but the whole “fullness of divinity” (πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος).46 The affinity 
of this view with Leontius’ position is evident throughout Contra Nestorianos: in 
chapter twenty-eight of book four Leontius attempts to distinguish Christ’s status 
from that of Jeremiah and John the Baptist by claiming that Mary gave birth to 
“the spirit itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα), which in this context clearly refers to Christ, 
whereas the latter two figures were anointed in the womb “through participation 
of the sanctifying spirit” (μετοχῇ τοῦ ἁγιαστικοῦ πνεύματος),47 and in chapter six 
of book five he distinguishes Jesus Christ from other “Jesuses” mentioned in the 
Bible by claiming that these other “Jesuses” were given that name “because of 
partial partaking of the spirit” (ἀπὸ μέρους πνευματικῆς μεταλήψεως).48 This 
shows that Leontius conceived of the difference between participation in the spirit 
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and reception of “the spirit itself” in terms of part and whole, i. e. in very much 
the same ways as  Antiochene and Nestorian authors did. 
 Therefore one can argue that Leontius was influenced by the conceptual frame-
work of his opponent, which he then modified to serve his own purposes. The first 
step that he took was to transpose this model to a protological context. This is not 
without precedent: Basil of Caesarea, for example, states in his Homiliae super 
psalmos that by breathing on Adam’s face God “deposited a part of his own grace 
in the human being in order that the like recognise the like” (μοῖράν τινα τῆς ἰδίας 
χάριτος ἐναπέθετο τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἵνα τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἐπιγινώσκῃ τὸ ὅμοιον).49 However, 
then he parted company with tradition altogether when he replaced the Holy Spirit, 
which is given to the soul, with the soul itself. The radical nature of this step be-
comes clear when we consider that not even the position of Cyril and Gregory of 
Nyssa that the souls were endowed with the substance of the Holy Spirit was uni-
versally accepted. Cyril of Jerusalem, for example, when interpreting the Pauline 
formula “divisions of the Holy Spirit” (μερισμοὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου), feels the need 
to add the comment that “it is not the Spirit that is divided but the grace through 
it” (πνεῦμα οὐ μεμέρισται ἀλλ’ ἡ δι’ αὐτοῦ χάρις).50 
 At this point we can recapitulate. Through the reworking of traditional themes 
Leontius creates a framework where the divine Son is present in the human being 
not as an additional endowment but rather as the soul and where the human souls 
become parts of the divine nature of the Son, which have been partitioned off from 
him. As I have stated, Leontius developed this model because it allowed him to 
counter the Nestorian contention that a composition of an uncreated entity and a 
created entity is impossible for he could then claim that there existed a precedent 
in Adam’s coming to be. This creates the impression that Leontius developed a 
heretical anthropology in order to defend an orthodox Christology. However, a 
closer look at his understanding of the incarnation shows that this is not the case. 
His reinterpretation of the coming to be of Adam as the composition of a part of 
the Son with a material body provides a parallel not so much for the traditional 
understanding of the incarnation as a composition between the Son and a humanity 
consisting of soul and body, but for a scenario where the Son takes the place of the 
soul within the human compound: as we have seen, the only difference between 
the coming to be of Adam and the incarnation lies in the fact that Adam’s soul is a 
“part” of the Son, whereas Christ’s soul is the “whole” Son. This is evident from 
the phrase “to deposit so-to-speak a pledge for the composition with him out of his 
own nature into the flesh from earth” (ὥσπερ ἀρραβῶνα τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν συνθέσεως 
καταβάλλεσθαι ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα). As I have already 
pointed out, the expression τὴν ἀπὸ γῆς σάρκα is clearly based on the phrase “dust 
from the earth” (χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς) in Genesis 2:7 and thus limits the meaning of 
“flesh” to the material body into which the divine “inbreathing” is then infused. In 
its context this phrase refers to the coming to be of Adam, but the choice of the 
word σάρξ alludes to John 1:14: “and the Word became flesh and took his abode 
in us” (καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο), and thus leaves no doubt that it also applies to 
Christ’s incarnation for which Adam’s coming to be provided a precedent. This 
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permits us to conclude that for Leontius the human element in the incarnate Son is 
a mere body, whereas the soul is to be equated the Son himself. 
 If one wished to play the heresiological game one could say that Leontius here 
develops an “Apollinarian” Christology. However, the similarity is only superficial, 
since unlike Apollinaris Leontius extends this model to all other human beings as 
well. Moreover, there is no sign that he ever drew the conclusion that the traditional 
Chalcedonian interpretation of the incarnation could be dispensed with. Indeed, he 
gives the impression that in the incarnate Word the divine is present twice, once as 
the soul and once as the divinity proper. Chapter nineteen of book one illustrates 
the problems that this view caused for Leontius’ theological position. There he is 
again confronted with the Nestorian claim that the sinlessness of Jesus cannot be 
attributed to the union with the Son of God but is the result of Jesus’ will and the 
support of the Holy Spirit since otherwise it would not be a genuine achievement.51 
He starts his refutation by claiming that in Jesus Christ the spirit plays the same 
role as does the free will in us since we are justified through the moral choices we 
make whereas Paul states in I Timothy 3:16 that Christ “was justified in the Spirit” 
(ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι), and then proceeds to state:   
 
Εἰ δὲ ὅπερ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεώς ἐστι αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης αἴτιον, τοῦτο 
τῆς Χριστοῦ φύσεως ἴσμεν εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθῶς θεὸς ἀληθ-
ινός,·πῶς οὐχί σαφέστατα ἡμῖν καὶ ἄκοντες τὴν θείαν φύσιν διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν 
Χριστῷ εἶναι δεδώκατε.52 
 
“But if as we know the free will and the cause of the righteousness of our nature 
correspond to the Holy Spirit of Christ’s nature, and this (sc. the Holy Spirit) is 
truly true God, how then have you not conceded to us even if against your will that 
the divine nature is in Christ through the spirit.” 
 
 In this passage Leontius juxtaposes “our nature” (ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις) with “the 
nature of Christ” (ἡ Χριστοῦ φύσις), which can only refer to Christ’s humanity, 
because otherwise the statement would take on a Monophysite character. That 
Leontius distinguishes the two “natures” from one another in this way is highly 
suggestive since according to official doctrine there is no difference between the 
humanity of Christ and the humanity of other human beings. And indeed the strict 
parallelism suggests that the Spirit belongs to Christ’s nature in the same way as 
the willing soul belongs to the nature of other human beings and that it is therefore 
part of the human compound. It is not difficult to see why Leontius would have 
taken this step: if he had not established complete equivalence between the Holy 
Spirit in Christ and the soul in ordinary human beings he would merely have re-
stated the position of his Nestorian adversary that the human being Jesus acts freely 
but has the support of the Holy Spirit. However, even such a scenario does not 
really answer the Nestorian question why a composition between the Word and a 
human nature should be necessary. After all, so far we have only dealt with the 
“human” sphere where the Holy Spirit takes the place of the soul. That Leontius 
was aware of this quandary becomes evident in the immediately following passage: 
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Ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ ἡγεμονικὸς λόγος κατορθοῖ μερικῶς, τοῦτο παντελῶς ὁ θεῖος 
λόγος πρὸς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καὶ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἡγεμονευόντων ἐν Χριστῷ 
κατώρθωσεν.53 
 
“For what the guiding word achieves in us partially, this has the divine word achiev-
ed in Christ completely, in addition to our (sc. word) both of him and of the others 
who are guiding.” 
 
 Here finally Christ’s achievements are attributed to the divine Word that accedes 
to the human “guiding word” (ἡγεμονικὸς λόγος) that is found both in Christ and 
in us, a term that can only refer to the human soul. However, the introduction of 
the divine component at this point creates severe problems: it is not clear who is 
responsible for the complete achievement of Christ, which distinguishes him from 
all other human beings who only manage partial achievements. Since Christ’s sin-
lessness has just been attributed to the Holy Spirit in his human nature the divine 
Word who enters into a composition with this nature appears to be curiously inert.  
However, is this really what Leontius wishes to say here? When we look more 
closely at the sentence we can see that it is construed in a rather curious way. A 
part of the main clause, namely τοῦτο παντελῶς ὁ θεῖος λόγος … ἐν Χριστῷ 
κατώρθωσεν, has an exact counterpart in the preceding relative clause ὃ γὰρ ἐν 
ἡμῖν ὁ ἡγεμονικὸς λόγος κατορθοῖ μερικῶς. Indeed, the parallelism is even further 
emphasised by the use of the term “word” (λόγος) in both cases. This makes the 
oddly phrased prepositional expression πρὸς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καὶ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν 
λοιπῶν ἡγεμονευόντων look like little more than an afterthought. If we leave this 
prepositional phrase aside and focus exclusively on the parallel elements a different 
scenario emerges; for then the “divine Word” (θεῖος λόγος) in Christ is correlated 
with the “guiding word” (ἡγεμονικὸς λόγος) in ordinary human beings. In such a 
scenario, however, the “divine Word” would no longer be the divine person that 
enters into a composition with a human nature but rather the Holy Spirit of the 
previous passage that was there presented as the entity responsible for the moral 
achievements of this human nature. That Leontius does indeed oscillate between 
these two models can be seen from the following passage, which concludes the 
chapter: 
 
Εἴτε οὖν ὡς συνυπάρχων τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι εἴτε ὡς πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως 
λεγόμενος οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης οὐχ ἕτερος 
αἴτιος.54 
 
“Whether co-existing with the Holy Spirit or being called “holy spirit” because of the 
nature and not because of the hypostasis, he himself and not another is cause of his 
own righteousness.” 
 
 Here Leontius sketches two alternative scenarios that are meant to explain how 
the justification of Christ was effected. The first scenario, that the divine Word co-
exists with the Holy Spirit, corresponds to our first reading of the previous passage 
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because the divine Word can only refer to the entity that enters into a composition 
with the human nature and the Holy Spirit must refer to the entity that is found 
within the “human” nature. By contrast, the second scenario, that the divine Word 
is identical with the “holy spirit”, identifies the divine Word with the divine entity 
that is within the human nature, and thus corresponds to our second reading of the 
previous passage, with the consequence that the hypostasis of the Word as the 
properly divine component has fallen out of the equation. 
 From the evidence presented so far it would appear that Leontius developed his 
heterodox views about the embodied soul and the incarnate Word because of the 
constraints of the Christological debate and an overdependence on the conceptual 
framework of his opponent. However, I would argue that these factors can only 
provide a partial answer to the question why Leontius deviated so radically from 
the theological mainstream of his time. It seems likely that he developed his 
conceptual framework because he already held the belief that the human soul is 
not a created entity that comes into existence simultaneously with or even after the 
body but instead shows a closer affinity to the divine and shares in its timelessness. 
This raises the question: what was the intellectual milieu in which Leontius pursued 
his theological speculations? The most likely answer to this is that he belonged to 
the Origenist circles of Palestine and that his worldview was influenced by Platonic 
concepts. 
 The affinity between Leontius’ speculations and the views of representatives of 
a Platonising interpretation of the Christian faith is striking. As I have already 
pointed out in the previous discussion, Gregory of Nyssa asserts that the human 
intellect is in the likeness of God because it is “the outflow out of the divine in-
breathing” (ἡ ἐκ τοῦ θείου ἐμφυσήματος ἀπόρροια), and Gregory of Nazianzus 
claims that the human souls were “a part of God that had flowed from above” 
(μοῖρα θεοῦ ἄνωθεν ῥεύσασα). Although these authors took great care not to 
attribute to the soul a divine status in the strict sense of the word, they tended to 
eschew clear references to a creation of the soul out of nothing. Therefore one can 
formulate the hypothesis that Leontius merely emphasised latent tendencies within 
the Origenist tradition and that he did so because his Christological argument 
required him to find an exact parallel for the incarnation where one component, 
the Son, was divine in the strict sense of the word. 
 This hypothesis can be substantiated when we turn to chapter twelve of book 
one. There the Nestorian author argues that whatever enters into a composition does 
so in order to draw profit from it. Leontius rejects this position and claims instead 
that God composed himself with man out of consideration for inferior beings. As 
so much of Leontius’ polemic, this argument is based on a wilful misunderstanding 
of his opponent’s position, who would have readily agreed that God did not profit 
from the incarnation and only questioned the specific point that the incarnation must 
be conceived of as a composition. Significantly Leontius does not address this point 
at all in his argument but instead offers several examples for altruistic behaviour 
beginning with the Son of God himself:     
 
Φησὶ γὰρ †αὐτὸν† τὰ λόγια, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγησάμενος τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ ἑαυτὸν 
ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών. τί οὖν χρήσιμον ἐκ τούτου γένοιτο τέλος κατὰ 
τὸν σκοπὸν ἐκβεβηκὸς τοῦ κενωθέντος; οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦ ἡμᾶς ἐκ δουλείας 
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ῥυσθῆναι οὓς προσελάβετο, καὶ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν αὐτοῦ περὶ ἡμῶν 
εὐδοκίαν τοῦ εἶναι κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι.55 
 
“For Scripture says †about him† that he did not regard being like God as something 
to be snatched but voided himself, having taken the form of a servant. What profit-
able end, then, could possibly accrue from this, after it had come to pass according 
to the plan of him who had been voided? None other but that we whom he took to 
himself be rescued from servanthood and that we be like God according to his orig-
inal good pleaure concerning us that we be according to the image and likeness of 
God.” 
 
 In this passage Leontius makes the point that the incarnation was a selfless act 
of the Son of God with the purpose of liberating human beings from their fallen 
condition and of restoring them to their original state. The passage is a patchwork 
of Biblical references: for the incarnation Leontius quotes from Philippians 2:6-7: 
“who being in the form of God did not regard to be like God as something to be 
snatched but voided himself, having taken the form of a servant, having come to 
be in the likeness of human beings” (ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν 
ἡγησάμενος τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοι-
ώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος), and for the description of the original state he re-
fers to Genesis 1:26: “Let us make a human being in our image and likeness” 
(ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν). However, 
rather than using these quotations side by side he merges them to create one over-
arching conceptual framework. The context shows clearly that Leontius makes a 
straightforward equation of “being like God” (εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ) with “being in the 
likeness of God” (εἶναι καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ), and consequently also between “being 
in the form of God” (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν) and “being in the image of God” 
(εἶναι κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ), which suggests to the reader a fundamental equivalence 
between the two sets of statements, in particular since the characterisation of God’s 
salvific work as a rescue “from servitude” (ἐκ δουλείας) implies that human beings 
should also be seen as having “the form of a servant” (μορφὴ δούλου). The result 
is a quite extraordinary deviation from traditional orthodox exegesis of Philippians 
2:6-11. Despite many disagreements on the finer points of interpretation most 
authors took it for granted that the subject shifts in the course of the statement: the 
original state and the following descent were seen as referring to Christ’s natural 
divinity and only the ensuing exaltation was interpreted as referring to his assumed 
humanity. By contrast, Leontius creates a circular framework within which human 
beings originally enjoyed the same status as “Christ” and made the same descent 
as him only to be exalted again together with him. 
 When we look for authors who could have inspired this exegesis of Philippians 
2:6-7, we find the closest counterpart in Origen. According to an excerpt from a 
letter by Theophilus of Alexandria, which is preserved in Theodoret’s Eranistes, 
Origen had distinguished the Son from Christ’s soul, arguing that “his soul was 
like God and in his form” (ἡ ψυχὴ τούτου ἴσα θεῷ καὶ ἐν μορφῇ αὐτοῦ), and stating 
that it was the soul “that had emptied itself and had taken the form of the servant” 
(τὴν κενώσασαν ἑαυτὴν καὶ μορφὴν δούλου λαβοῦσαν).56 This suggests that 
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Leontius was influenced by the Origenist belief that human souls had originally 
been pure intellects in close communion with God and had then fallen and become 
embodied, with the exception of the intellect associated with the Son of God, which 
voluntarily descended to the world of matter in order to save the fallen. Such inter-
pretation can be further substantiated when we consider the phrase “according to 
his good pleasure concerning us from the beginning” (κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν αὐτοῦ 
περὶ ἡμῶν εὐδοκίαν), which bears a marked resemblance with Ephesians 1:6 
where Paul states that “according to the good pleasure of his will” (κατὰ τὴν 
εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ) God elected us “before the foundation of the 
world” (πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου) and thus can be seen as a further allusion to the 
pre-existence of the souls. However, at the same time it is clear that this model has 
undergone fundamental modifications. As we have seen Leontius develops this 
theme in order to prove the Chalcedonian point of view that the incarnation must 
be understood as a composition of the Word with a human nature. Accordingly the 
agent of Philippians 2:6-11 can no longer be the soul of Christ but must be the Son 
of God. It is evident that this shift has implications for the status of the souls of 
the human beings whose salvation the incarnation was to effect: the symmetry of 
the argument requires that they would then also need to be fully divine. The only 
element that does not seem to accord with this interpretation is Leontius’ assertion 
that human beings had their primeval likeness with God “according to his good 
pleasure concerning us from the beginning” (κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν αὐτοῦ περὶ ἡμῶν 
εὐδοκίαν), which gives the impression that the divine image is the result of a 
divine act of will. However, this comment is not as unequivocal as it first seems 
because it could refer to the decision of God to separate from his own substance 
the elements that were then to become the souls. Chapter twelve of book one thus 
suggests that Leontius started out as an Origenist and was then carried away by 
the constraints of the Christological debate, which forced him to formulate a much 
more extreme position. 
 Leontius was without doubt fully aware of the fact that he deviated radically 
from the consensus that had been established in previous centuries; otherwise he 
would not have exploited terminological and conceptual ambiguities and made 
terminological substitutions in order to create arguments that at first sight appear 
entirely orthodox. However, it is noticeable that such caution does not extend to 
every part of his work. In the previous discussion we have come across several 
passages where he makes quite explicit statements that his contemporaries would 
surely have immediately identified as utterly heretical. This raises the question: 
how could Leontius hope to escape condemnation and persecution? After all, it is 
a well-known fact that Origenists whose views were considerably less outré than 
Leontius’ had been denounced as heretics at the Second Council of Constantinople 
and had then seen their writings destroyed by the authorities, with the result that 
they are now lost in the Greek original and are only known from Syriac translations. 
 An explanation may present itself when we consider the historical context in 
which Leontius wrote. In a previous article I have dated Contra Nestorianos to the 
seventh century and have argued that it most likely postdates the Persian sack of 
Jerusalem.57 This means that Leontius may well have been active during the Persian 
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occupation of Palestine or even after the Muslim conquest of the East. It is obvious 
that during these two periods the official church could not rely on the state to 
enforce its own theological positions as it had done in the previous centuries. 
Therefore one might argue that Leontius availed himself of the newly found 
freedom in order to voice his radical ideas, in particular since similar views are 
expressed in writings of other authors of the time.58 Anastasius of Sinai, for 
example, who lived in the second half of the seventh century, wrote a Speech on 
the Divine Image, which contains the following passage about the origin of the 
soul: 
 
Οὐ δι’ ἕτερόν τι κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ ὁμοίωσιν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ 
ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς θείας ὑποστάσεως ἐκείνου τοῦ θείου ἐμφυσήματος 
ὥσπερ ἀπόρροιάν τινα θεοῦ ἢ ἀποσκίασμα τὴν λογικὴν πνοὴν τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῷ 
μεταδοθεῖσαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ἐμφύσημα καὶ θεόσδοτον καὶ θεόστομον γέννημα 
οὔτε ἄγγελος οὔτε Χερουβὶμ … ἠξιώθη δέξασθαι.59 
 
“For no other reason is the human being called according to the image and likeness 
of God than because of his having it from the divine hypostasis itself of that divine 
inbreathing, like an outflow of God or a shading-off, having given the rational breath 
of life to the soul, which inbreathing and god-given and god-mouthed offspring 
neither angel nor Cherubim … was deigned worthy to receive.” 
 
 Here is not the place to embark on an in-depth interpretation of this passage. 
However, even a cursory reading reveals a marked similarity with Leontius’ 
position: the soul is described as an outflow of God and as being out of the divine 
inbreathing, which is characterised as a hypostasis and as an offspring of God. This 
shows that other authors in the seventh century could make exalted statements 
about the soul and suggests that Leontius may have been a less isolated figure 
than he now seems to be. 
 At this point we can summarise the results of our discussion. At the beginning 
of this article I showed that in his treatise Contra Nestorianos Leontius identifies the 
soul in the compound Adam with the “divine inbreathing” and that he characterises 
the “inbreathing” itself with as an emanation from God. I argued that he took this 
step because he wished to counter the Nestorian claim that a composition between 
an uncreated and a created entity is impossible: by interpreting the coming to be 
of Adam as just such a composition he could claim that the incarnation was only 
one instance of a widespread phenomenon. In a second step I then demonstrated 
that Leontius defended the twofold consubstantiality of the incarnated Christ by 
drawing a parallel with the human compound where the human parents are only 
the causes of the bodies while the souls have God as their father. Through close 
reading of several passages I attempted to show that Leontius considered God and 
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the souls to be consubstantial and that he understood their relationship as a genetic 
one in the strict sense of the word. Having set out the conceptual framework within 
which Leontius made his case for a Chalcedonian Christology I then proceeded to 
show that one of his starting points was the traditional view that Adam’s soul was 
endowed with the Holy Spirit itself and not just with a derivative grace. This model 
had the advantage that it located “God” in the human being but the disadvantage 
that this presence remained extrinsic to the human compound. To make it function 
as a precedent for the incarnation of the Word Leontius therefore introduced two 
modifications: he substituted the Son for the Spirit and he reduced the human 
nature to the body, thereby indicating that the soul must be divine. In order to 
distinguish the case of Christ from that of Adam and other human beings he 
employed the Biblical motif of the “pledge”, which was traditionally used to 
contrast the partial spiritual endowment of the believers in this world with their 
complete spiritual endowment in the world to come but which he now applied to 
Adam and Christ. This permitted him to claim that in Adam the Son was only 
present partially whereas in Christ he was present completely. These modifications 
led to a further deviation from the theological mainstream: not only was the soul 
no longer a creature but instead a part of the divine; the incarnation was also no 
longer conceptualised as the composition of the divine Word with a human nature 
consisting of body and soul but rather as a composition of the divine Word as soul 
and a human body, with the consequence that the properly divine component of 
traditional Christology could no longer be given a satisfactory role in the salvation 
of mankind. One reason for this shift was obviously a too great dependence on the 
conceptual framework of his Nestorian opponent whose focus had been on the 
endowment of the human being Jesus with the Holy Spirit, who thus assumed a 
crucial role in the incarnation. Leontius accepted this framework, as well as the 
Nestorian custom to see the difference between the Spirit in Jesus and the Spirit in 
other human beings in quantitative terms, and merely modified it by identifying the 
Holy Spirit with the Son on the one hand and with the soul on the other. However, 
the constraints of the Christological debate and overdependence on the conceptual 
framework of his opponent can only provide a partial answer to the question why 
Leontius deviated radically from the theological mainstream. It is evident that he 
would only have developed his views if he had already held the belief that the 
human soul is not a created entity that comes into existence simultaneously with 
or even after the body but instead shows a closer affinity to the divine and shares 
in its timelessness. His interpretation of Philippians 2:6-7 suggests that Leontius 
was a latter-day Origenist who could express his ideas more freely than his 
forebears because the political circumstances of the early seventh century made 
enforcement of orthodoxy impossible in the Eastern provinces. 
 
